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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of India today wields a degree of power that many 
foreign legal observers would find extraordinary and unusual.  Scholars 
of comparative law sojourning in India today will encounter an active 
and powerful judiciary that would have left even Alexis de Tocqueville 
wide-eyed.  Remarkably, the Indian Court in January 2007 recently
reaffirmed, that under the Indian Constitution, constitutional amendments 
may be held unconstitutional as violative of the “basic structure” of the
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was a response to the central
government’s efforts to insulate land reform and other economic 
legislation from judicial review, through the addition of a new section— 
the Ninth Schedule—to the Indian Constitution.
Constitution. The Court’s initial assertion of the basic structure doctrine 
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American jurists would also be intrigued to learn that the Indian Court 
has taken on an active and central role in the governance of the Indian
polity through its interventions in Public Interest Litigation (PIL) cases,
and in some cases, has virtually taken over functions that were once the
domain of Parliament and the Executive.  Within the past two decades,
the Indian Court wrested control over judicial appointments from the 
Executive,1 and assumed a leading role in policymaking in the areas of
affirmative action, environmental policy, education, and development. 
However, as this article illustrates, both of these aspects of judicial power in
India share curious similarities to parallel developments in the United
States, France, and Israel.
The Indian judiciary’s foray into governance has even prompted critique
from within the Supreme Court itself.  In December 2006, Justice 
Markandey Katju issued a strong cautionary warning about the Court’s 
expanding role in governance in the Aravali Golf Course case, noting: 
If the judiciary does not exercise restraint and overstretches its limits, there is 
bound to be a reaction from politicians and others.  The politicians will then
step in and curtail the powers, or even the independence of the judiciary. If there
is a law, judges can certainly enforce it, but judges cannot create a law and seek
to enforce it. Judges must know their limits and must not try to run the government.
They must have modesty and humility, and not behave like emperors.  There is 
a broad separation of powers under the Constitution and no organ of the State—
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary—should encroach into each
other’s domain.  We are compelled to make these observations because we are
repeatedly coming across cases where judges are unjustifiably trying to perform
executive or legislative functions.2 
Following the ratification of the Indian Constitution in 1950, few 
Indian scholars could have predicted the scope of the Court’s activity
and power today. Although the early Court was activist in the area of
property rights and affirmative action, few Indians could have imagined
that the Court would ultimately emerge as the supreme arbiter of the
1. See Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Ass’n v. Union of India, (1993) 2 
Supp. S.C.R. 659 [hereinafter Second Judges’ Case].
2. Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass, (2007) 12 S.C.R. 1084, 
1091, 1098. Although the ruling by this two-judge panel could not overturn decades of 
PIL doctrine, it temporarily induced a state of chaos and confusion in some High Courts, 
as judges were uncertain whether or not it was appropriate to entertain PIL cases.  However, a
week after the ruling, Chief Justice Balakrishnan in a later case argued that the ruling
was not binding on other panels or courts.  B. Sinha & S. Prakash, Judicial Over-reach 






























      
    
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
constitutionality of amendments, or that the Court would become so
engaged in such a vast array of policy areas.  So how do we explain the
Court’s extraordinary role in Indian politics and governance in 2007? 
This article examines two critical “moments” in the expansion of
judicial power in India: the assertion of the basic structure doctrine and
the development of the PIL regime in the post-Emergency Indian Court. 
The Indian Supreme Court asserted two key functional roles in these 
moments: (1) the role of a constitutional guardian3 in asserting its role in
preserving the basic structure of the Constitution, and (2) as a champion 
of the rule of law and responsible governance in developing PIL.  Though 
both moments were significant in the empowerment of the Indian Supreme
Court, I argue that development of PIL was the critical turning point in
the transformation of the Indian Supreme Court.  Through PIL, the Court 
became an auditor and active participant in the governance of the Indian 
polity.
What makes the expansion of judicial power in India so remarkable is
that the Indian Court has overcome important political and structural 
constraints to emerge as an important institution of governance in modern 
India. Although the Indian Supreme Court was armed with the power of 
judicial review, appellate jurisdiction over the state High Courts, advisory 
jurisdiction through presidential reference of issues, and original jurisdiction 
based on Article 32—which allows for direct suits in the Supreme Court
to enforce the Fundamental Rights provisions,4 and empowers the Court to 
issue writs to enforce these rights5—three key aspects of India’s political 
structure and historical legacy limited the Court’s development early on.
First, under the original design of the Constitution of the framers, the 
Constituent Assembly, the Court was intended to be a junior, subservient
institution, whose decisions could easily be overridden by the Parliament
through the constitutional amendment process by simple majorities. 
Second, the Constituent Assembly placed important limits on the power 
of the Indian Court, including eliminating a due process clause from the
final draft of Article 21 to prevent the Court from reviewing the socialist
Congress regime’s redistributive, collectivist, and economic policies as 
3. See T.R. ANDHYARUJINA, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
10–15, 22–23 (1992). 
4. See INDIA CONST. arts. 13 (judicial review), 14–31 (fundamental rights provisions). 
5. INDIA CONST. art. 32, §§ 1, 2 (“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred
by this Part— 
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part”).
178
MATE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2010 11:32 AM     
  








    
 
 











   




[VOL. 12:  175, 2010] Two Paths to Judicial Power
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
well as from reviewing the government’s provisions for preventive 
detention.6  Third, the British legacy of Austinian positivism (brought to
India because so many of India’s early jurists were schooled or trained in 
England or schooled in Indian law schools versed in British traditions) 
meant that India’s early jurisprudence would be limited by more
formalist modes of constitutional interpretation.7 
Part II of this article traces the origins and development of the Basic
Structure doctrine, from the battle over property rights in late 1960s 
through the Court’s landmark decision in Kesavananda Bharati in 1973, 
and then proceeds to examine the development of the doctrine to the 
present. Part III examines the development of the PIL regime in the
post-Emergency Indian Supreme Court from 1977 onward, and then 
analyzes transformation and change in the Court’s role in PIL cases.
Part IV then seeks to assess the relative importance of these two
“moments” and paths in the context of the development of judicial 
power in India, and then situates the two moments and paths in a 
comparative context.  Part V examines these moments and paths from 
the lens of “credible commitments” theory, and assesses their relative
strengths and weaknesses as legitimation strategies.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE AND THE CONSTITUENT 
POWER OF AMENDMENT
Following India’s independence and the drafting and ratification of the 
Indian Constitution in 1950, both the Supreme Court and state High 
Courts openly challenged state-level land reform that sought to abolish 
the zamindari (landholder) regime, through which zamindars had effectively 
become landlords under British colonial rule.  Wealthy landholders thus 
6. For an analysis of the Indian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of
preventive detention laws and personal liberty, see Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due
Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Preventive Detention, and Personal Liberty
Cases, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216 (2010).
7. According to Arthur Von Mehren, a renowned scholar of comparative law, the 
emphasis on formalism in early Indian judicial decisions inevitably results in a “static
conception of the law.” See Mark Galanter, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE
BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA 484 (1984) (citing Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Law and 
Legal Education in India: Some Observations, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1180 (1965)). Similarly,
George Gadbois, another scholar who has studied the Indian Judiciary observed that the 
Indian legal system is characterized by “procedural nitpicking,” “hair splitting legalisms,”
“literal interpretation,” “narrow, technical, and mechanical” approaches expressing “concern 
for form, not for policy or substance.”  See id.
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did battle with state and national elites, intent on redistributive land 
reform policies in the High Courts and Supreme Courts.  The courts 
invalidated land reform policies on the grounds that they did not provide 
adequate compensation to landholders.  In response to these early
decisions, the government amended the Constitution, introducing a series of
amendments to Article 31 (property rights) in response to judicial 
decisions invalidating land reform policies.8  In the First Amendment, the
government added Article 31(A) and Article 31(B) to the Constitution.
Article 31(A) “placed all laws enacted for the purpose of abolishing the 
proprietary and intermediate interests in agricultural lands above 
challenge in the courts” on the grounds that they violated any of the
fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution.9  Article 31B insulated 
any laws placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial
review.
In a series of decisions in 1954, the Court ruled that even economic 
regulations that caused restrictions on property rights constituted an 
abridgment of the property right, and thus triggered the compensation
requirement.10 In these decisions, the Court interpreted the term
“compensation” in Article 31 as requiring fair and adequate compensation.11 
In response, the government passed the Fourth Amendment, which
sought to limit compensation only to those cases where the state actually
acquired property, and stipulated that it was the state—the government 
—not the courts, who would have the final say in determining the 
amount of compensation required.  In addition, the Amendment expanded
the number of categories of legislation contained in Article 31A that 
were immune from challenge for abridging the fundamental rights 
provisions contained in Articles 14, Article 19, or Article 31, and also 
added seven additional acts to the Ninth Schedule.12  The battle over 
8. Article 31 of the Constitution set forth protections for private property, and in 
its original form, stipulated that:
(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law; (2) No 
property, movable or immovable including any interest in or in any company 
owning any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of
or acquired for public purposes under any law authorizing the taking of such 
possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or
specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation 
is to be determined and given. INDIA CONST. art. 31, § 1, cl. a–e.
9. S.P. Sathe, Supreme Court, Parliament, and the Constitution, 6 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 1821, 1824 (1971) (discussing INDIA CONST. art. 31A). 
10. See State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 170; State of
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92; Srinivas v. Sholapur Spinning & 
Weaving Co., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 119. 
11. Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
110 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000). 
12. See Sathe, supra note 9, at 1824–25. 
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property rights continued into the 1960s, and the government responded 
to the invalidation of two state land reform measures by passing the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which sought to expand the term “state” in 
Article 31 to encompass a broader array of land units, and also added an 
additional forty-four laws into the Ninth Schedule to immunize them
from judicial review.13  The battle between the judiciary and the
government over property rights culminated in two landmark decisions— 
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab14 in 1967, and Kesavananda Bharati v. 
State of Kerala in 1973.
A. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1964)
At issue in Golak Nath was whether the Parliament’s power to amend 
the Constitution under Article 368 was unlimited.  In Sankari Prasad v. 
Union of India,15 a challenge to the First Amendment, the petitioners 
argued that the new amendment violated Article 13(2), which prohibited 
the government from passing any “law” that infringed upon the 
fundamental rights provisions, and that an amendment was included in 
the definition of law.16  However, the Court rejected this argument, 
holding that “there [was] a clear demarcation between ordinary law 
made in exercise of legislative power, and constitutional law made in 
exercise of constituent power.”17  Similarly, in Sajjan Singh v. State of 
Rajasthan,18 the Court adjudicated a challenge to the constitutionality of
the Seventeenth Amendment.  In upholding the Amendment, the Court
reaffirmed its earlier decision in Shankari Prasad.19 
The Court in Golak Nath overruled these earlier judgments by a 6 to 5 
ruling, and ruled that Parliament cannot enact constitutional amendments 
that violate the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution.20 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice K. Subba Rao held that Article
13. The Supreme Court invalidated the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act of 1961, and
the Madras Land Reforms Act of 1961, on the grounds that the state governments had 
defined the term “estate” as excluding “ryotwari estates,” the subject of the local land reform
regulations. See Krishnaswami v. Madras, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1515; Kunhikonam v. Kerala, 
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 723. 
14. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762, 762. 
15. Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, (1952) 1 S.C.R. 89. 
16. Id. at 91–92. 
17. Id. at 106. 
18. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 933, 933–34. 
19. Id. at 934. 
20. Golak Nath, (1967) 2 S.C.R. at 762. 
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368 did not actually confer the power to amend the Constitution, but 
rather set forth the procedures for amendment.21  He went on to hold that
amendments enacted under Article 368 were ordinary “laws” under 
Article 13, and thus could be subject to judicial review.22  The Court also
ruled that it was within Parliament’s power to convene a new Constituent 
Assembly for purposes of amending the Constitution.23  Finally, in a 
strategic move, the Court invoked the doctrine of “prospective overruling,”
which meant that the ruling would only apply to future amendments, and 
that the First, Fourth, and Seventeenth Amendment though deemed to be
unconstitutional, would remain in effect.24 
Although Golak Nath ultimately did not have the effect of invalidating 
the three amendments, the Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India did
seek to mitigate the effect of the Fourth Amendment, which stipulated
that the adequacy of compensation in takings would be non-justiciable.25 
In R.C. Cooper, the Court invalidated the Bank Nationalization Act
passed by Indira Gandhi’s Congress government, on the grounds that the 
Act provided only illusory compensation, and constituted hostile 
discrimination by imposing restrictions only on certain banks.26  The 
Court went on to rule that that it could hold that regulations were not
“reasonable” under Article 31(2) of the Constitution where those regulations
failed to provide adequate compensation.  In another challenge to the 
Gandhi government, the Court in Madhav Rao Scindia v. India27 invalidated 
the Gandhi government’s efforts to abolish the titles, privileges, and
privy purses of the former rulers of the princely states. 
In response to these rulings, Indira Gandhi dissolved the Lok Sabha 
early (for the first time in India’s political history), and openly campaigned
against the Court, promising to make basic changes in the Constitution 
to provide for social equality and poverty alleviation.28  Following a
landslide win, Gandhi’s government enacted three amendments to override
the Court’s rulings.  It enacted the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which
sought to overrule Golak Nath by affirming and reasserting Parliament’s
unlimited power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, including 
the fundamental rights provisions, and declared that such amendments 
were not ordinary “laws” under Article 13, and thus could not be subject 
21. See id. at 763. 
22. See id. at 764. 
23. See id.
24. See id. at 765. See also Sathe, supra note 9, at 17. 
25. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564, 608. 
26. Sathe, supra note 9, at 18. 
27. Madhav Rao Scindia v. India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530, 658. 
28. Sathe, supra note 9, at 18. 
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to judicial review by the Court.29  The government also sought to override
the R.C. Cooper decision by enacting the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
which sought to make compensation associated with land acquisition 
laws non-justiciable, sought to give primacy to the Directive Principles in
Article 39 over the Fundamental Rights provisions in Article 14, Article
19, and Article 31, and stipulated that laws enacted by the Central and 
state governments to give effect to the Directive Principles could not be 
challenged in Court.  Finally, the Twenty-Ninth Amendment was enacted to
add two Kerala land reform laws to the Ninth Schedule. 
B. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
In Kesavananda,30 a thirteen-judge bench of the Court heard a series
of challenges to the Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Ninth 
Amendments. In a 1,002 page decision consisting of eleven separate 
opinions, the Court overruled its earlier decision in Golak Nath in 
holding that Parliament could amend the fundamental rights provisions,31 
but also held that under Article 368, Parliament could not enact
constitutional amendments that altered the “basic structure” of the Indian 
Constitution.32 
29. Id. 
30. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
31. See Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 114. 
32. At the time of the decision, there was a great deal of confusion regarding the 
actual “ratio” or rationale underlying the majority decision in Kesavananda, as only six 
justices held that the power of constitutional amendment was not unlimited, given that 
there were implied limitations on it, while six other justices held that the power of amendment 
was unlimited. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3, at 26.  The end of the opinion, 
however, contained a summary of the “view of the majority” that was signed by nine of 
the twelve justices that asserted that Parliament could not alter the basic structure through the
amending power under Article 368.  See id. (citing Kesavananda Bharati, A.I.R. 1973
S.C. at 1461–62).  The “tie-breaking” opinion was Justice Khanna’s, though this was on
very narrow grounds.  Khanna, while also holding that there “were no implied limitations on
the amending power” also held that “the words ‘amendment of the Constitution’” in 
Article 368 “cannot have the effect of destroying or abrogating the basic structure of
framework of the Constitution.” Kesavananda Bharati, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. at 1463.  However, 
the six other justices that held that there were implied limitations on the amendment
power did not base their rationale on interpretation of the term “amendment” in Article
368. Consequently, several leading scholars noted that there was no real majority
rationale supporting the basic structure doctrine, and because the Court never sought to 
consider all of the judgments to derive a ratio. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3, at 26– 
27 (citing 2 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 2635 (3d ed.)). See also
H.M. Seervai, Fundamental Rights Case at the Cross Road, 75 BOM. L. REP. 47 (1973). 
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The seven-judge majority upheld the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-Ninth
amendments in their entirety, and part of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
However, the Court held that the second section of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment was invalid and violated the basic structure of the Constitution, 
because that section improperly delegated the power of amendment to 
the state legislatures, and allowed for the abrogation of the basic features
of the Constitution by allowing for the government to take away the 
fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 19, and 31. As noted above, 
that part had added Article 31C to the Constitution, which provided that
“no law containing a declaration that is for giving effect to” the directive 
principles under Articles 39(b) and (c) “shall be called in question in any 
court on the ground that it” does not give effect to such principles”.33 
The justices offered differing views of what might comprise the basic
structure of the Constitution.  Chief Justice Sikri held that the basic 
structure included five features: 
(i) Supremacy of the Constitution, (ii) Republican and democratic form of 
government, (iii) Secular character of the Constitution, (iv) Separation of powers
between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, (v) Federal character of
the Constitution.  The above structure is built on the basic foundation, i.e. the
dignity and freedom of the individual.  This is of supreme importance.  This cannot 
by any form of amendment be destroyed.34 
In addition to the foregoing features, Justice Shelat believed “the unity
and integrity of the nation” and “the mandate given to the state in the 
directive principles of state policy” were also basic features of the
Constitution.35 
What was particularly striking about the Kesavananda decision was
that it represented a direct political challenge by the Court to the
electoral mandate of Gandhi’s Congress regime, which had won 350 out 
of 545 seats in the 1971 elections.  In its manifesto, Gandhi’s Congress 
party sought a mandate “for the reassertion of Parliamentary Supremacy
in the matter of amendment of fundamental rights,” a direct reference to
the Court’s decision in Golak Nath.36  In fact, in its decision, the Court 
went so far as to question the electoral mandate of the Congress party,
noting that “[t]wo-thirds of the members of the two Houses of Parliament
need not represent even the majority of the people in this country.  Our
electoral system is such that even a minority of voters can elect more
than two-thirds of the members of either House of Parliament.”37  The
 33. Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 114. 
34. Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225, 316–17 (Sikri, C.J.)
35. Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 S.C.C. at 454 (Shelat, J.). 
36. UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS 22 (1980) [hereinafter
BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS].
37. Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 S.C.C. at 481. 
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controversial decision did not sit well with Indira Gandhi, and she 
proceeded to supersede the next three senior justices in the Kesavananda
majority by selecting A.N. Ray as the next Chief Justice.  In terms of its
historic importance, most scholars of Indian constitutional law today
have recognized and noted the significance of this moment in India’s 
political and constitutional history, though the immediate reaction to the 
decision was more hostile.38 
C. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain (1975)
The basic structure doctrine was invoked by the Court during the
Emergency Rule regime of Indira Gandhi in the case of Indira Nehru 
Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain.39  The case involved a challenge to the Thirty- 
Ninth Amendment, enacted in response to a decision of the Allahabad
High Court that set aside Indira Gandhi’s election on the grounds that 
her campaign had committed a “corrupt practice.”40 The Amendment
added six new clauses to Article 329(A). The High Court’s decision,
coupled with growing national agitation among opposition leaders calling
for Gandhi’s ouster, led Gandhi to declare an Emergency on June 25,
1975, in addition to appealing the High Court’s decision to the Supreme 
Court.41  Part of the Thirty-Ninth Amendment was enacted to retroactively 
validate Indira Gandhi’s election by superseding the applicability of all 
previous election laws and immunizing all elections involving the Prime 
Minister or Speaker of the Lok Sabha from judicial review.42 
The Five-judge bench in Indira Nehru Gandhi, which consisted of 
four justices (Chief Justice Ray, Justice M. Beg, K.K. Mathew, and Y.V. 
Chandrachud) ultimately accepted and applied the basic structure doctrine, 
with four out of the five justices voting to invalidate Clause Four of 
38. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, The Constitutional Quicksands of Kesavananda Bharati 
and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 1 S.C.C. (Jour) 45 (1974) (observing that the Kesavananda
Bharati decision represented the “constitution of the future”).  Although most other 
scholars now have accepted the legitimacy of the basic structure doctrine leading scholars of
constitutional, including Tripathi, Seervai, and Andhyarujina, were originally critical of 
the decision. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3, at 10; P.K. Tripathi, Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala—Who Wins? (1974) 1 S.C.C. (Jour) 3; Seervai, supra note 32. 
39. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, (1975) 2 S.C.C. 159. 
40. Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 115. 
41. Other factors cited by Gandhi in declaring an internal Emergency included 
widespread national agitation and unrest and labor strikes nationwide. 
42. Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 116. 
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Article 329(A).43  Justice Khanna held that the clause violated the basic
structure of the Indian Constitution, by contravening the “democratic 
set-up” of the Constitution and the “rule of law,” given that democracy 
requires that “elections should be free and fair.”44  In contrast, Justice 
Chandrachud invalidated the clause on the grounds that it violated the 
basic structure in that it represented “an outright negation of the right to 
equality,” and as “arbitrary, and calculated to damage or destroy the rule
of law.”45  Justices Ray and Matthew held that Article 329A was invalid 
“because constituent power cannot be employed to exercise judicial
power.”46 
D. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)
While the Kesavananda decision may have represented one of the 
boldest assertions of judicial authority to date in India, it ultimately
imperiled judicial power by directly leading to the supersession of the
three most senior justices and elevation of a pro-government justice,
A.N. Ray, to Chief Justice, and indirectly leading to the declaration of 
Emergency Rule, in which the Court’s powers were dramatically curbed. 
With respect to the development of the basic structure doctrine, the truly 
pivotal “moment” may indeed be the Court’s twin decisions in Minerva
Mills and Waman Rao, in which the Court reasserted the basic structure 
doctrine against Indira Gandhi’s newly elected government (Gandhi 
defeated the Janata coalition in January 1980) by invalidating several
Emergency amendments that had limited or curbed the Court’s
jurisdiction and powers of judicial review. 
In Minerva Mills v. Union of India,47 the Court heard a challenge to 
the Sick Textiles Nationalization Act of 1974, which had been added to 
the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution through the Thirty-Ninth 
Amendment thus, immunizing the Act from judicial review. Pursuant 
to the Act, the National Textiles Corporation had taken over textiles 
mills in Karnataka, on the grounds that these mills were being “managed 
in a manner highly detrimental to the public interest.”48  The petitioners
challenged the Thirty-Ninth Amendment, passed during the Emergency,
which had barred judicial review of constitutional amendments by
43. Id. 
44. BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS, supra note 36 at 57 (citing 
Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1975) Supp. S.C.C. 1, 90–92). 
45. Id. (citing Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1975) Supp. S.C.C. 1, 257–58). 
46. Id. (citing Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1975) Supp. S.C.C. 1, 90–92). 
47. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 4 S.C.C. 222. 
48. Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 118. 
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amending Articles 368(4) and 368(5) of the Constitution.49  The Court
ultimately invalidated two provisions of the Forty-Second Amendment,50 
Section Four, which subordinated the fundamental rights in Article 14 
and Article 19 to the directive principles, and Section Fifty-Five, which 
provided that the validity of any constitutional amendments promulgated 
following the enactment of the Forty-Second Amendment could not be 
challenged in any court, on any ground, and that the constituent power of 
Parliament to amend the Constitution was an unlimited one.51  Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Chandrachud reaffirmed the basic structure 
doctrine of Kesavananda, and found that both Sections were unconstitutional
in that they sought to expand the amending power to enable the
government to repeal or abrogate the Constitution, given that “a limited
amending power is one of the basic features of our Constitution, and 
therefore, the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed.”52  In  
holding that Section Four was invalid, Justice Chandrachud observed
that Part III and Part VI of the Indian Constitution, which refer to
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, respectively, were of equal 
importance, and that this “harmony and balance between fundamental 
rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic
structure of the Constitution.”53  Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in his concurring 
opinion, held that both a limited amending power, as well as the power 
of judicial review of government actions, were part of the basic structure 
of the Constitution.
In Waman Rao v. Union of India, the Court reaffirmed the basic structure
doctrine, holding that all amendments enacted after the Kesavananda
decision of April 24, 1973, including laws added to the Ninth Schedule, 
were subject to judicial review under the basic structure doctrine.  Applying
the basic structure doctrine, instead of relying solely on precedent, 
the Court upheld Article 31(A) and Article 31(C), added by the First
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment, on the grounds that these 
Amendments were enacted to effectuate the Directive Principles contained
49. Id.
50. This represented a bold assertion of judicial power, given that the petitioner had not
challenged the validity of Forty-Second Amendment in this matter.  See ANDHYARUJINA, 
supra note 3, at 22. 
51. See The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, §§ 4, 55, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in. See also Minerva Mills, (1980) 3 S.C.C. at 642–48, 652–57, 660. 
52. Minerva Mills, (1980) 3 S.C.C. at 643. 
53. Id. at 654. 
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in Article 39(b) and Article 39(c).54  The Court also upheld the un-amended
portion of Article 31(C) (the Minerva Mills decision struck down the 
amended version as consistent with the basic structure doctrine and ruled
that, “laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive 
principles contained in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39” would fortify,
not damage, the basic structure).  As one leading scholar and senior
advocate observed, the Court’s decisions in Minerva Mills and Waman
Rao “gave the Court the opportunity to regain the role of ‘sentinel’ which
had suffered significant erosion during the Emergency.”55  Since 1980,
the Court’s application of the basic structure doctrine, while no doubt
significant, has been sporadic and limited, though its intervention stands 
out in two key areas.
E. Administrative Tribunals and the Basic Structure Doctrine 
From the early 1970s through the 1980s, the governments of Indira 
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi also sought to reform the judicial system through 
the enactment of the Thirty-Second and Forty-Second amendments, 
creating a system of administrative tribunals to deal with the growing
number of disputes involving government services.  In 1973, the government 
introduced the Thirty-Second Amendment, adding Article 371(D) to the 
Constitution.  In 1987, the Court in P. Sambamurthy v. Andhra Pradesh56 
invalidated Clause Five of Article 371(D), on the grounds that the provision 
required that orders of administrative tribunals be confirmed by the 
relevant state government.  Because the tribunals were set up to adjudicate
disputes regarding government services and did not allow High Court 
appeals, the Court held that failure to make these tribunals as independent as
High Courts violated the basic structure.
Section 46 of the Forty-Second Amendment introduced Article 323,
which authorized Parliament to establish a system of administrative
tribunals with jurisdiction over matters involving service of government 
employees and disputes involving a broad array of government policies.
A closer look at Article 323(B) demonstrates that the Gandhi Emergency 
regime was keen on reigning in the courts through the creation of a 
54. See Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 121.  Sections (b) and (c) of Article 39
(Directive Principles) provide that: 
The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing—
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community
are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; 
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration
of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. INDIA CONST.
art. 39, paras. b, c. 
55. Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 121. 
56. Sathe, supra note 9, at 88–89. 
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parallel system of administrative courts with jurisdiction over such key 
areas as land reform, industrial and labor disputes, and elections.57  In  
1985, the government of Rajiv Gandhi enacted the Administrative Tribunal 
Act of 1985.
The Act was challenged in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, on
the grounds that Article 323(A) violated the basic structure of the 
Constitution.  While ruling that judicial review is part of the basic structure 
of the Constitution, the Court in Sampath Kumar actually upheld the 
Administrative Tribunal Act, since the new administrative courts had the 
power of judicial review and were “no less efficacious than” the High 
Courts.58  However, the Court re-interpreted the Act so as to save its 
validity, ruling that the Act’s appointment provisions, which provided 
for executive control over appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, 
and Members of the Administrative Tribunal would be unconstitutional 
since judicial independence is a basic essential feature of the Constitution. 
The Court thus held that its decision would apply prospectively (thus 
upholding existing appointments under the Act), and that the Act would 
be saved if the government adopted an appointment process in which the 
government was required to consult with the Chief Justice and defer 
heavily to the Chief Justice’s recommendations.  However, in 1997, the 
Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. India59 overruled its decision in S.P.
Sampath Kumar. The Court in L. Chandra Kumar held that Article 
323(A)(2)(d) contravened the basic structure in that it allowed Parliament to
exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 over the 
administrative tribunals, and only allowing appeals to the Supreme 
Court.60  The Court’s decision represented a reassertion of judicial authority 
over the administrative tribunal system. 
F. Secularism: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
In 1992, a coalition of Hindu rights organizations launched a campaign 
that ultimately resulted in the demolition of the Babri Masjid (which was 
alleged to have been built at the site of a former Rama temple) also
resulting in the acquiescence and support of the BJP government in Uttar 
Pradesh, which led to heightened communal violence throughout India. 
57. Ramachandran, supra note 11, at 122–23. 
58. Sathe, supra note 9, at 88–89. 
59. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 S.C.C. 261. 
60. See Sathe, supra note 9, at 88–89. 
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In response, the President dismissed the BJP governments in Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh.  In Bommai, the Court
proceeded to uphold these dismissals under Article 356 of the Constitution 
on the grounds that the President’s actions were necessary to save the
basic structure of the Constitution, since the state governments were not
functioning in accordance with secularism, which the Court ruled to be
part of the basic structure of the Constitution.61  According to S.P. Sathe, 
Bommai was “the most important and politically significant decision of 
the Court since Kesavananda Bharati” because the Court extended the 
doctrine of review under the basic structure doctrine to “the exercise of
power by the President” under Article 356 of the Constitution.62 The
Court thus expanded its power to include the review and scrutiny of
political decisions relating to state elections and politics.63 
Through the development and entrenchment of the basic structure 
doctrine, the Court helped assume a “guardian”64 role in protecting and 
preserving basic features of the Constitution from being altered by 
political majorities. In its decisions adjudicating the constitutionality of 
administrative tribunals, the Court asserted the basic structure in order to
safeguard judicial independence.  Furthermore, its decisions in S.R. 
Bommai and its progeny have enabled the Court to play an active role in 
defending secularism and policing federalism in cases involving the 
central government’s emergency powers of dissolution.  Additionally, 
the Court in I.R. Coehlo recently reasserted the basic structure doctrine 
in holding that the Court could review the validity of all amendments 
inserted into the Ninth Schedule after the Kesavananda decision in 
accordance with the basic structure of the Constitution and the fundamental 
rights provisions.65 The basic structure doctrine thus ultimately proved to
be a powerful bulwark against the excesses of majoritarian politics in
India. In essence, the Court’s assertion of this doctrine enabled the
Court to apply the “brakes” on radical constitutional change, reassert and
safeguard judicial review, and reinforce core structural features of the 
Indian constitution—secularism and federalism.
61. See id. at 96–98. 
62. See id. at 152. 
63. Id.  The Court in Bommai examined the manifesto and political ideology of the 
BJP party in determining that the BJP governments would not act in accordance with
“the principle of secularism.” Id. at 176; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 
1 at 137–38, 147, 151–53, 172–75, 290–93 (Verma, J., asserting that no “judicially
manageable standards” exist for scrutinizing Presidential actions under Article 356 and 
that such controversies “cannot be justiciable”). 
64. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3.
65. See I.R. Coehlo v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1999) 2 Supp. S.C.R. 394, 396–98. 
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III. PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND THE INDIAN 
SUPREME COURT
Although the Court’s decisions in Kesavananda and Minerva Mills
represented key moments, the Court’s expanded role in governance today 
can be traced to the development of PIL.  Through PIL, the Court asserted 
itself as a champion of the rule of law in checking and ameliorating 
government illegality and statutory noncompliance.66 
A. The Historical Context 
Following Congress’ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s dissolution of 
the Lok Sabha and sudden call for elections on January 18, 1977, a 
broad-based coalition of opposition parties united to form the Janata 
Party coalition to challenge Indira Gandhi’s Emergency regime. The 
Janata coalition defeated Indira Gandhi in the March 1977 elections,
campaigning on a manifesto that called for an end to Emergency rule, 
the repeal of restrictions on the media, repeal of the draconian preventive 
detention laws allowing for preventive detention, warrantless search and 
seizure, wiretapping, and rescinding the anti-democratic Forty-Second 
Amendment.67  The victory by the Janata Party marked the first time that
a party other than Congress took control of the Central government. 
Two key developments ultimately helped facilitate the extraordinary 
expansion of the Court’s role in governance in the post-Emergency 
period. First, increased media attention focused on state repression of
human rights and governance failures, and heightened media coverage of 
early PIL cases in these areas, led to a surge in public interest litigation 
claims filed with the Court.  Second, the Court reinterpreted Article 32 
in order to widen standing to expand access of the Court to the poor and
marginalized as well as third-party public interest groups, and also
expanded its equitable and remedial powers to enable it to assert an
enhanced monitoring and oversight function.
66. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3, at 29–30. 
67. 1 MADHU LIMAYE, JANATA PARTY EXPERIMENT: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF
OPPOSITION POLITICS: 1975–1977, at 153–57, 205–15, 295 (1994). 
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B. The Media and PIL
According to Upendra Baxi, the news media played a critical role in
the immediate post-Emergency years by focusing national attention on 
government lawlessness and repression of human rights. National
newspapers, such as the Indian Express, published investigative reports 
on the excesses of the Emergency period.  In addition, these papers 
highlighted atrocities committed by state and local police, the abhorrent 
condition of prisons, and abuses in the systems of protective custody,
such as mental homes for women and children.  This shift in media
attention “enabled social action groups to elevate what were regarded as
petty instances of injustices and tyranny at the local level into national 
issues, calling attention to the pathology of public and dominant group 
power.” In commenting on the importance of the media in bolstering 
PIL, Baxi observed: 
All this enhanced the visibility of the court and generated new types of claims for
accountability for wielding of judicial power and this deepened the tendency towards 
judicial populism.  Justices of the Supreme Court, notably Justices Krishna Iyer
and Bhagwati, began converting much of constitutional litigation into SAL, 
through a variety of techniques or juristic activism.68 
During the Janata years, the Court pioneered a new activist
jurisprudential regime in the area of fundamental rights that would 
ultimately provide the substantive doctrinal foundation for the Court’s 
expanded role in governance.  As illustrated in Chapter 3, the Court in
Maneka Gandhi turned away from the more restricted approach to 
interpretation of the fundamental rights delineated in its earlier decision 
in Gopalan v. State of Madras(1950).69 In Maneka, the Court dramatically 
broadened the scope of the right to life and liberty in Article 2170 by
effectively reading the concept of due process into that provision, and 
broadened the scope of rights based scrutiny of government actions 
under Article 1471 and the seven “fundamental freedoms” contained in
Article 19.72 
68. See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, infra note 73, at 114. 
69. (1950) S.C.R. 88. 
70. INDIA CONST. art. 21 (providing that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”).
71. INDIA CONST. art. 14 (“Equality before law—The State shall not deny to any 
person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India.”). 
72. INDIA CONST. art. 19 (“Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of
speech, etc.—
(1) All citizens shall have the right—
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assembly peaceable and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions; 
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PIL was an extension of the legal aid movement that had been launched 
during the Emergency, from 1975-1976, by Indira Gandhi, and represented 
a significant component of Indira Gandhi’s social-egalitarian Twenty-
Point Programme.73  Supreme Court Justices, V.R. Krishna Iyer and P.N. 
Bhagwati, both appointees of the Indira Gandhi regime, were both leading 
advocates in the government for policies and programs expanding legal 
aid.74 Both judges helped lead efforts prior to, and during, the Emergency
to expand legal aid and access to justice by organizing legal aid camps in 
villages, encouraging high court justices to adjudicate grievances in
villages, and established camps and people’s courts.75 
C. The Expansion of Standing Doctrine 
The landmark case that helped solidify the practice of expanded locus
standi into doctrine was S.P. Gupta v. Union of India  (Judges’ Case).76 
The Judges’ Case was a critical decision in that the Court asserted an
expanded view of locus standi—standing—in a matter dealing with a 
challenge to a salient and sensitive area—control over judicial transfers 
and appointments.  In the Judges’ Case, the Court adjudicated a
consolidated group of claims filed by senior advocates challenging the 
Gandhi Government’s assertion of the  power to transfer state high court 
judges without their consent.  The government challenged the locus 
standi of the petitioners, arguing that they lacked standing because they 
did not suffer a legal harm or injury as a result of the transfers, and that 
only the judges themselves could bring claims. 
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; 
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;
(f) to acquire, hold, and dispose of private property [repealed by 44th 
Amendment]; and 
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or
business.”).
 73. Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme 
Court of India, 1985 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 113 [hereinafter Baxi, Taking
Suffering Seriously].
74. Id.  As Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court, Bhagwati chaired the state 
legal aid committee of that state, which issued recommendations for broadening legal aid 
and access to justice. See  GOV’T OF GUJARAT, REPORT OF THE LEGAL AID COMMITTEE
(1971). Similarly, Justice Krishna Iyer chaired a central government panel that called for
restructuring the legal system. See Expert Committee on Legal Aid, Report on Processual 
Justice to the People, in VIRENDRA KUMAR, 11 COMMITTEES & COMMISSIONS IN INDIA
1971–73, at 195 (1988). 
75. See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 73, at 113–14. 
76. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365. 
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The Court rejected the government’s standing objections, ruling that 
the advocates had a strong interest in maintaining the independence of 
the judiciary, and that the challenged transfers dealt directly with the 
issue of judicial independence.  As Justice Bhagwati notes in his opinion: 
The profession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the judicial system
and lawyers may figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice . . .
They are really and truly officers of the court in which they daily sit and practice.
They have, therefore a special interest in preserving the integrity and independence
of the judicial system and if the integrity or independence of the judiciary is
threatened by any act of the State or any public authority, they would naturally
be concerned about it, because they are equal partners with the Judges in the 
administration of filing the writ petition.77 
The Court thus proceeded to hold that independence of the judiciary is 
part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. 
In upholding the petitioners’ standing to bring the suits, the Court 
proceeded to lay out a new, expanded conception of standing for PIL
claims, based on an activist interpretation of Article 32.  The Court took 
note of earlier exceptions to standing rules under both United States, 
British, and Indian common law,78 including Indian case law in which 
the Court had recognized broadened standing to bring suits against the 
government for statutory or constitutional failures.79 
While broadening the standing doctrine and allowing the advocates’ 
claims, the Court’s ultimate decision in the Judges’ Case was quite 
deferential to the Executive, with five out of the seven justices voting to 
uphold the primacy of the Executive in matters of judicial transfers and
judicial appointments.80  The majority of the Court, in ruling on the
merits of the claims, held that, even though the term “consultation” 
under Article 124(2) and Article 222(1) required that the Executive
consult with at least one Justice of the Supreme Court and of the High 
Court in addition to the Chief Justice of India, it did not mean that the 
Executive was required to follow the opinion or advice of these judges. 
77. Id. at 533 (Bhagwati, J.). 
78. See id. at 515, 529 (citing Queen v. Bowman, (1898) 1 QB 663 (holding that
any member of the public had right to be heard in opposition to an application for a license); 
A-G ex rel. McWhirter v. Indep. Broad. Auth., (1973) Q.B. 629 (“The McWhirter case”) 
(holding that McWhirter had sufficient interest and standing to bring action against 
Broadcasting Authority for threatening to show film that did not comply with statutory 
requirements as television as television viewer). 
79. See, e.g., Mun. Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 97 (holding
that local residents had standing under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
bring suit against municipality to force them to carry out statutory duty of constructing a 
drain pipe to carry sewage on a certain road). 
80. UPENDRA BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN SUPREME 
COURT IN THE EIGHTIES 38 (1985) [hereinafter BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION].
194
MATE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2010 11:32 AM     
  
   
 
 

























[VOL. 12:  175, 2010] Two Paths to Judicial Power
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
The Court’s decision in the Judges’ Case was thus a classic Marbury
move in that the Court sought to expand its own jurisdiction by
expanding standing for PIL, but gave the government what it wanted by
deferring to the supremacy of the Executive in transfers and appointments.
Indeed, as Upendra Baxi notes, the Court’s decision appeared to be more
strategic than motivated by doctrine, in fashioning “a strategy of
‘something for everybody’” by giving both the Bar and the government 
victories.81  But the key point here is that the Court asserted the doctrine
of expanded standing in a matter of high national salience when it had 
been previously invoked only in matters of lesser importance.  The 
government clearly won the battle.  However, the Court arguably won 
the war for expanded judicial power by establishing and legitimating
broadened standing for the Bar and other groups to bring a steady stream
of claims against the government in the public interest. 
What is groundbreaking about the Judges’ Case is that it openly and 
explicitly redefined the role of courts as a mechanism by which
individuals could challenge the failures of government in terms of
statutory non-enforcement, violations of the Constitution, or breach of 
public duty. As Justice Bhagwati noted in his opinion: 
We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest
can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach
of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law 
and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional
or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, 
furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the
constitutional objective.82 
The Supreme Court thus assumed a new oversight and accountability
function through which it has expanded its power in reviewing the 
actions of national and state government entities.  Justice V.R. Krishna 
Iyer describes this new function succinctly in his opinion in another
early PIL decision, Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v.  Union of India,83 
observing that law “is a social auditor and this audit function can be put 
into action only when someone with real public interest ignites this 
jurisdiction.”84
 81. Id. at 39. 
82. S.P. Gupta, (1982) 2 S.C.R. at 530–1. 
83. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344. 
84. S.P. Gupta, (1982) 2 S.C.R. at 530–31. 
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D. The Expansion of Equitable and Remedial Powers 
From 1977 through the 1980s, the Court dramatically expanded the
scope of its equitable and remedial powers in PIL by taking on cases
involving government illegality and state repression of human rights.85 
One critical procedural innovation that distinguished PIL from ordinary
civil litigation in India involved the scope of the Court’s remedial power 
in such cases. In one of the first PILs, Hussainara Khatoon v. State of 
Bihar,86 the Court broke new ground in developing the procedural
innovation of “continuing mandamus.” In Hussainara, the Court responded
to a writ petition filed by a journalist based on a series of articles
published in the Indian Express about the problem of undertrials in the 
state of Bihar and other states. Undertrial prisoners were prisoners who
had served extensive pre-trial detention terms in jail because they were
unable to afford bail. In many cases, these prisoners had been in jail
longer than the actual sentence that would have accompanied a conviction
for the crime they were accused of committing.87  The writ was based on 
a series of articles in the Indian Express documenting the plight of the 
undertrials in Bihar.88 
The litigation broke new ground on several fronts.  First, the Court 
allowed Hingorani to bring the habeas petition on behalf of the undertrial
prisoners, effectively relaxing the standing requirement.89  Second, the
Court issued relief in the form of orders and directives, without issuing
dispositive judgments, in order to retain jurisdiction over the matter. This 
enabled the Court to monitor the progress of the litigation.  In a series of
orders, the Court laid down new guidelines for reforming the administration 
of bail.90  These new guidelines stipulated that the government was required
to inform all undertrials of their entitlement to bail, and that the government 
would have to release undertrials if their period of incarceration
exceeded the maximum possible sentence for the offences for which 
detainees had been charged.91  The Court ordered the release of the 
undertrials that had been mentioned and identified in the news article.92 
Through the innovation of continuing mandamus developed in 
Hussainara, the Supreme Court in subsequent cases retained jurisdiction 
85. See Rajeev Dhavan, Law as Struggle: Public Interest Litigation in India, 36 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 302 (1994).





91. Oliver Mendelsohn, The Supreme Court as the Most Trusted Public Institution
in India, 23 J.S. ASIAN STUD. 103, 110 (2000). 
92. See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 73. 
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over public interest litigation matters by issuing orders and directives 
without issuing final dispositive judgments.93  Clark Cunningham referred
to this procedural innovation as “remedies without rights,”94 which was
invoked in many subsequent governance cases—”Hussainara thus set a
pattern which the Supreme Court has followed in many public interest
cases: immediate and significant interim relief prompted by urgent need
expressed in the writ petition with a long deferral of final decision as to 
factual issues and legal liability.”95  Since 1980, the procedural innovation 
of continuing mandamus allowed the Court to expand its power by 
allowing subsequent benches to retain jurisdiction over PIL matters for 
many years so as to monitor and oversee the implementation of the
Court’s directives and orders.96 
1. Epistolary Jurisdiction 
During the Janata years, the Court also began loosening standing 
requirements by treating letters from individuals, journalists, or third 
parties as legal petitions under Article 32,97 initiating what Upendra Baxi
has termed “epistolary jurisdiction.”98 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.
Union of India99 (B.M.M.), a three-justice bench of the Court consisting 
of Justice P.N. Bhagwati, R.S. Pathak, and A.S. Sen initiated a PIL in 
response to a letter petition filed by Swami Agnivesh, the head of a 
social reform group committed to ending the practice of bonded labor in 
93. Id. 
94. Clark Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Supreme Court: A
Study In Light of the American Experience, 29 J. INDIAN L. INST. 494, 511–15 (1987). 
95. Id. at 512. 
96. An example of this is the ongoing Godavarman “forest bench” case. See Godavarman
Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, (2008) 8 S.C.R. 152, 154. Although this PIL was first
filed in 1995 to address deforestation in one protected forest in South India, the Court 
has broadened and extended its jurisdiction in this case to effectively take over the day-
to-day management and governance of all of India’s forests, including issues related to
mining and tribal use of forest lands. 
97. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution reads:
“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part—
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement 
of any of the rights conferred by this Part.”
98. See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 73, at 116–18. 
99. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67. 
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India, Bandhua Mukti Morcha. B.M.M. was filed as a “letter complaint,”100 
building on the Court’s adoption of new epistolary jurisdiction procedures 
announced in the First Judges’ case, in which the Court held that:
Where the weaker sections of the community are concerned, such as under trial 
prisoners languishing in jails without a trial, inmates of the Protective Home in
Agra, or Harijan workers engaged in road construction in the district of Ajmer,
who are living in poverty and destitution, who are barely eking out a miserable 
existence with their sweat and toil, who are helpless victims of an exploitative
society and who do not have easy access to justice, this Court will not insist on
a regular writ petition to be filed by the public-spirited individual espousing
their cause and seeking relief for them.
This Court will readily respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting
pro bono publico. It is true that there are rules made by this Court prescribing 
the procedure for moving this Court for relief under Article 32 and they require
various formalities to be gone through by a person seeking to approach this
Court. But it must not be forgotten that procedure is but a handmaiden of
justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any 
procedural technicalities . . . . Today a vast revolution is taking place in the
judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast changing and the problems of the 
poor are coming to the forefront.101 
In their letter, B.M.M. alleged that: (1) large numbers of migrant
laborers from other states were working in inhumane conditions in stone 
quarries located in Faridabad (a town outside of Delhi), including toxic
dust, the lack of potable drinking water, and other basic amenities; and
(2) that many of these workers were “bonded laborers”—which referred 
to laborers who were forced to work little or nominal wages for an 
employer because of a debt incurred by the laborer or their ancestors,
and relinquished their freedom to work for another employer.102 The
system of bonded labor antedated Indian independence and led the 
Constituent Assembly to include Article 23 in the Constitution, which
outlawed all forms of forced or bonded labor.  Unfortunately, the Article 
was not given effect or implemented until 1976, when the government
finally enacted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, but this 
legislation was still unsuccessful in eradicating the practice nationwide.103 
B.M.M. thus sought relief from the Court for enforcement and 
implementation of constitutional provisions and statutory law, in light of 
the government’s failure to reign in the bonded labor system in
Faridabad and failure to address the persistence of inhumane working 
and living conditions in the stone crushing quarries.104  Specifically, the
state of Haryana was alleged to have violated Article 23 of the Bonded




S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, 520–21. 
B.M.M., (1984) 2 S.C.R. at 94–96. 
Id. at 91–92. 
104. Id. at 96. 
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Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1976, the Mines Act, which provided 
that all quarry workers were entitled to certain wages and benefits, and
the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act of 1979,which also provided that 
migrant workers were entitled to a broad range of benefits.105 
2. Nonadversarial Fact-finding 
The Court in B.M.M. also broke new ground by adopting non-
adversarial fact-finding methods and appointing two advocates and a 
doctor as commissioners, who were charged with visiting certain quarries to
interview and identify bonded laborers and investigate the working and 
living conditions.106  The report issued by these three individuals confirmed 
that many of the quarry workers were bonded laborers and that the 
working conditions were indeed poor—many workers and their families 
had tuberculosis because of the dust pollution, were forced to draw and 
drink water from a dirty river, had inadequate housing, and many children
lacked adequate clothing.107 
The respondent in B.M.M., the State of Haryana who was represented
by the Solicitor General of Haryana, and one of the mine owners 
represented by private counsel, challenged B.M.M.’s standing to bring 
the suit. In addition, the respondents challenged the Court’s power to
appoint commissioners, and also argued that the reports of the 
commissioners and the doctor had no evidentiary value and were
inadmissible as they were only based on ex parte statements that had not 
been subjected to cross-examination.108 
The Court rejected the respondents’ standing objections by affirming
that third parties could bring suits in the public interest pursuant to the
Court’s ruling in the S.P. Gupta decision. Justice Bhagwati thus held 
that “[w]here a person or class of persons to whom legal injury is caused
by reason of violation of a fundamental right is unable to approach the 
court for judicial redress on account of poverty or disability or socially 
economically disadvantage position, any member of the public acting 






Id. at 67. 
Id. at 96, 99.
Id. at 97. 
Id. at 100.
Id. at 105. 
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Moreover, the Court rejected the respondents’ objections to the 
commissioners’ reports, as the Court observed that Article 32(1) did not 
mandate adversarial proceedings for suits brought in enforcement of the
fundamental rights, given that the Article stipulates that, “The right to
move the Supreme [C]ourt by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.”110  Bhagwati noted
that the framers of the Indian Constitution, in using the term “appropriate 
proceedings:” 
. . . [D]eliberately did not lay down any particular form of proceeding for
enforcement of a fundamental right nor did they stipulate that such proceeding 
should conform to any rigid pattern or strait-jacket formula as, for example, in
England, because they knew that in a country like India where there is so much 
of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and exploitation, any insistence on
a rigid formula of proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental right would become 
self-defeating because it would place enforcement of fundamental rights beyond 
the reach of the common man . . . .111 
Bhagwati thus held that the Court was free under Article 32 to depart 
from the “Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence” in adopting novel, non-
adversarial procedures that included court-led fact finding through
appointed commissions. 
In terms of motives, the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in developing
PIL was driven by the social-egalitarian policy values of senior justices 
of the Indian Supreme Court.  In interviews conducted in association 
with this project, both Justices Bhagwati and Justice Krishna Iyer stated
that they were both motivated by aspirational motives—a desire to 
advance the cause of social justice and human rights—in  advancing the
PIL regime. Justice Bhagwati stated that he was motivated by a sincere
desire to uplift the poor by activating the public interest jurisdiction of 
the Court after witnessing the extreme poverty of individuals who came 
to the Gujarat district court during his tenure as Chief Justice of the
Gujarat High Court in the 1960s.112  As a Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Bhagwati toured the country and held several open meetings, noting: 
I saw stark naked poverty, and the utter helplessness of the people, they came 
and attended their meetings and looked upon me with awe, but they never tasted
the fruits of this whole system of justice—justice was far[,] far removed from
them—then I realized that justice I was administering in the courts was hollow
justices—never reached the large masses of my own people. . .I realized I
needed to address the three As which prevent them from accessing justice—the
lack of awareness, lack of availability of  machinery, and the lack of assertiveness . . .
So I said I must evolve a method by which they can come to court and what was 
110. Id. at 105–07. 
111. Id. at 107. 
112. See, e.g., Interview with P.N. Bhagwati, Former Supreme Court Chief Justice,
New Delhi, India (Jan. 2007). 
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preventing them was our whole doctrine of locus standi or standing.  Because
any NGO or other person could not bring a litigation on their behalf under the 
system as it then prevailed.113 
Justice Krishna Iyer also noted that his early efforts to develop PIL were
informed by his desire to expand  popular access to justice, and by his 
past experience in the area of prison reform. Krishna Iyer  recounted his 
own past experience as a young lawyer who was thrown into jail (under 
the existing preventive detention laws) for defending Communists and 
other dissident groups in the 1950s.  Later, as a minister in the Communist
state government of Kerala, Krishna Iyer  spearheaded prison reform as 
one of his main goals.114 
In addition, the Court’s activism and assertiveness in early PIL cases
was driven by senior Justices’ desire to bolster the institutional legitimacy 
of the Court.  The Court thus sought to atone for its acquiescence to the 
Gandhi regime during the Emergency rule period in the Shiv Kant
Shukla decision.115  In Shiv Kant Shukla, the Court upheld the regime’s
suspension of access to the courts by political detainees (through habeas 
petitions), and thus overturned the actions of several high courts.116 
These high courts had decided to hear several habeas petitions of
detainees, notwithstanding the declaration of Emergency rule. Baxi
suggests that the Court’s activism in PIL was partly “an attempt to
refurbish the image of the Court tarnished by a few Emergency decisions 
and also an attempt to seek new, historical bases of legitimization of
judicial power.”117  Baxi observed that during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the Court was “seeking legitimacy from the people and in that 
sense (loosely) there are elements of populism in what it is now doing.”118 
E. The Expansion of the Governance Role of       
the Indian Supreme Court 
In the post-Emergency era, the Indian Supreme Court dramatically
expanded its role in governance. This section analyzes the Court’s 
involvement in three significant issue areas: (1) environmental policy;
113. Id.
114. Id.
 115. BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION, supra note 80, at 36–37. 
116. See A.D.M Jabalpur v. Shukla, (1976) Supp. S.C.R. 172, 175.  See also Burt
Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 476, 482 (2003). 
117. BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION, supra note 80, at 36. 
118. BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 126. 
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(2) judicial appointments and administration; and (3) corruption and 
accountability. It also examines the Court’s continued involvement in 
other areas including education, human rights, affirmative action, and 
development policy.
1. Environmental Law
In the 1980s, the Indian Supreme Court began adjudicating a wide 
range of environmental cases, and has continued to play an important
role in environmental law.  Since the late 1980s, environmental advocates 
such as M.C. Mehta, described by some as a “One Person Enviro-Legal
Brigade,” have brought numerous claims that have been heard by the
Court, including the Shriram Oleum Gas Leak Case,119 the Delhi Pollution 
120 121Case, the Taj Mahal Pollution Case, and the Delhi Vehicular
Pollution and Traffic Regulation Cases.122  In these cases, the Court
developed a new doctrine of tort law, and also developed and used
new remedial powers to enforce existing statutory laws dealing with 
environmental degradation.  For example, in the Shriram Oleum Gas
Leak Case, the Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability in cases 
involving industries engaged in hazardous or dangerous activities.123 
The Court has also developed the “polluter pays” principle or doctrine to 
reign in the deleterious effects of unchecked industrialization in cases 
involving the discharge of toxic effluents.124  In another case dealing 
with pollution caused by tanneries in Tamil Nadu,125 the Court developed 
the “precautionary principle” in holding that the state authorities “must
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation” 
in dealing with pollution to promote sustainable development in harmony
with the environment.126  In addition, the Court has construed the right to
life in Article 21 broadly, so as to include the right to clean air and good
air in dealing with the carcinogenic effect of diesel exhaust.127 
The Court has exercised broad remedial powers, closing factories or 
other commercial plants that are found to be in violation of environmental 
statutes, and has also developed the practice of maintaining these cases
119. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1986) 1 S.C.R. 312, 312. 
120. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 3 Supp. S.C.R. 49, 56, 77. 
121. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 3 S.C.C. 715. 
122. See Ashok Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public Interest Litigation:  Potential and Problems, 
in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE. supra note 11, at 172 nn.92 & 94. 
123. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1986) 1 S.C.R. 312 at 337–38. 
124. See Desai & Muralidhar, supra note 122, at 172–73 n.11. 
125. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 647. 
126. See Desai & Muralidhar, supra note 122, at 172 n.100 & 107. 
127. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1998) 2 Supp. S.C.R. 24, 24–25. 
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on the docket to enable monitoring of such cases to ensure compliance.128 
In perhaps one of the most famous pollution cases, the Court, after
monitoring the situation for over three years, ordered that 292 industries 
either switch to natural gas as an industrial fuel or relocate from the Taj 
Mahal “Trapezium” area.129  In the Delhi Vehicular Pollution cases, the
Court ordered that auto rickshaws, buses and other vehicles convert to 
Clean Natural Gas to help reduce pollution in Delhi.130 
As Cunningham observes, beginning in Hussainara Khatoon in 1979,
in which the Court helped to end the practice of “protective custody”
through orders mandating the release of thousands of prisoners in Bihar, 
the Court in PIL cases has granted relief through interim orders: 
Hussainara thus set a pattern which the Supreme Court has followed in many
public interest cases: immediate and comprehensive interim relief prompted by
urgent need expressed in the writ petition with a long deferral of final decision
as to factual issues and legal liabilities . . . . Most recently in the Shriram Fertilizer
Gas Leak case the court ordered the plant to be closed, set up a victim compensation
scheme, and then ordered the plant reopening subject to extensive directions, all 
within ten weeks of the gas leak, without first deciding whether it had jurisdiction
under article 32 to order relief against a private corporation.131 
Through this use of “continuing mandamus” the Court retains jurisdiction 
and control over particular matters to monitor and oversee the
implementation of its directives and orders. 
In environmental and other matters, the Court has often assumed the 
role of a quasi-administrative agency through the designation of special 
investigatory or monitoring committees.132  In dealing with the issue of 
deforestation, the Supreme Court in the T.N. Godavarman133 cases 
designated a High-Powered Committee to serve as an investigative, fact-
finding arm of the Court and to oversee the implementation of the Court’s 
orders. The Court and the Committee have become intensely involved in
the oversight and administration of forests since Godavarman, prompting 
128. See id. 
129. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 10 S.C.R. 1060, 1060–61. 
130. See S.C. Writ Pet. (Civil), M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Apr. 5, 2002) (No. 
13029/1985), available at http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=1102. See also
Armin Rosencranz and Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution Case: The Limits of Judicial
Power, 28 COLUMBIA J. OF ENVTL. LAW 223 (2003).
131. Cunningham, supra note 94, at 512. 
132. The Court asserted its power to engage in investigative fact-finding and appoint
commissions for this purpose in the bonded labor case. See B.M.M., (1984) 2 S.C.R. at
80, 84–85. 
133. Godavarman, supra note 96, at 154. 
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one leading scholar to suggest that the Court and this Committee have
“virtually become the Ministry of Forests.”134  In Godavarman and other
PIL cases, the Court has also developed the concept of the writ of
“continuing mandamus” to keep a matter pending to allow the Court and 
its advisory committees to continue monitoring government agencies.135 
As T.R. Andhyarujina has observed, the courts in India today “not only 
correct unreasonable conduct of the State but lay down norms of
reasonable conduct for the State.  These rules of conduct and schemes 
are akin to those made by administrative agencies themselves.”136 
2. Judicial Independence 
PIL ultimately proved to be a path to complete judicial independence 
for the Court.  In 1993, the Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record Assn v. Union of India137 (Second Judges’ Case) again dealt with 
the issue of the Executive’s power of judicial appointments.  In response
to a PIL filed by a Supreme Court advocate in Subhash Sharma v. Union 
of India, seeking relief in the filling up of vacancies of judges in both the 
Supreme Court and High Courts, that panel ruled that the “correctness of 
the majority view in S.P. Gupta” should be considered by a larger bench.  
In the Second Judges’ Case, the Court ultimately overturned S.P. Gupta, 
holding that the Chief Justice of India (in consultation with a collegium
of two senior Justices), not the Executive, had primacy and the final say 
in judicial appointments and transfers.  In reaching its decision, the
Court relied on two key rationales. 
First, the Court rejected the rationale in S.P. Gupta that the Executive 
should have primacy because it is more accountable to the people as an 
elected branch, and in an interesting manner, utilized the Court’s
changed role as a basis for the primacy of the Chief Justice.138  Writing 
for the majority, Justice J.S. Verma noted that the notion of executive
accountability regarding appointments “is an easily exploded myth, a 
bubble which vanishes on a mere touch.  Accountability of the Executive 
to the people in the matter of appointments of superior judges has been
assumed, and it does not have any real basis,” because the Executive 
does not discuss appointments with Parliament in light of the fact that
134. Armin Rosencranz & Sharachchandra Lele, Supreme Court and India’s Forests, 
ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 2, 2008, at 11. 
135. See Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1997) 6 Supp. S.C.R. 595, 604 (ordering 
and monitoring investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation into the Jain-Hawala
political corruption case).
136. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3, at 34. 
137. Second Judges’ Case, (1993) 2 Supp. S.C.R. at 659. 
138. Id. at 694. 
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political parties do not make judicial appointments a key issue in their 
election manifestos.139  In contrast, Justice Verma noted that it is the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and High Courts that are, in practice,
more accountable to the Bar in the matter of appointments and proper 
functioning of the courts, noting:
On the other hand, in actual practice, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief 
Justice of the High Court, being responsible for the functioning of the courts, 
have to face the consequence of any unsuitable appointment which gives rise to 
criticism leveled by the ever vigilant Bar.  That controversy is raised primarily in the
courts. Similarly, the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, whose 
participation is involved with the Chief Justice in the functioning of the courts, 
and whose opinion is taken into account in the selection process, bear the
consequences and become accountable.140 
The Court in the Second Judges’ Case thus recognized an important shift 
in its institutional function by securing accountability in governance 
matters, including the administration of the judiciary itself and the Bar’s 
important role as a vigilant “constituency” of the Court. 
The second rationale for the Court’s holding was based on the recent
practice of deferring to the Chief Justices of the Supreme Courts and
High Courts by the Executive in the process of appointments and
transfers. The Court thus transformed actual practice into doctrine in the 
Second Judges’ Case, “locking in” judicial independence through a bold 
and unprecedented assertion of judicial independence.141  Through PIL,
the Court has continued to assert its independence and control over 
judicial administration in a series of decisions dealing with state level
appointments and administration.142 
139. Id. at 694–95. 
140. Id. 
141. See In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, (1998) 2 Supp. S.C.R. 400, 423–25 
(the “Third Judges’ Case”) (revisiting its decision in the Second Judges’ Case to rule 
that the Chief Justice must consult with a collegium of the four (instead of two) senior-
most justices on the Court). See also Desai & Muralidhar, supra note 122, at 188 n.81. 
142. See All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 S.C.C. 247 (dealing
with pay scales of High Court judges and subordinate judiciary); All India Judges 
Association v. Union of India, (1994) 4 S.C.C. 727 (issuing directions dealing with the 
provision of residential accommodation to all judicial officers, libraries, vehicles and 
recommending the establishment of an All India Judicial Service); All India Judges 
Association v. Union of India, (1994) 4 S.C.C. 288 (prescribing minimum qualifications 
for appointment in state courts). 
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3. Corruption and Accountability
The Vineet Narain case is a prototypical example of the Court’s
assertion of expanded equitable powers in action in the area of corruption 
and government accountability. In that case, the Court asserted power 
over the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in light of the CBI’s 
failure to investigate and prosecute several prominent politicians who
had been named in the “Jain diaries” discovered by journalist Vineet 
Narain. Narain helped expose a scam involving the illegal financing of
terrorist groups through a series of illicit transactions. Politicians and
corrupt bureaucrats were also implicated in the scam.  The Court effectively 
began taking over monitoring and control of the CBI’s investigation, 
noting that, “the continuing inertia of the agencies to even commence a
proper investigation could not be tolerated any longer.” The Court also 
observed that since“merely issuance of a mandamus directing the agencies
to perform their task would be futile,” the Court was compelled to “issue 
directions from time to time and keep the matter pending requiring the
agencies to report the progress of the investigation . . . so that the court
retained seisen of the matter till the investigation was completed and the 
chargesheets were filed in the competent court for being dealt with 
thereafter, in accordance with law.”143 
The Court invoked Article 32 and Article 142 to issue directives and
guidelines which effectively delinked the CBI from political control to 
ensure it more autonomy.  The Court thus invoked the novel equitable 
power of “continuing mandamus” to assert a continuing jurisdiction over 
the case, enabling the Court to monitor the CBI:
There are ample powers conferred by Article 32 read with Article 142 to make 
orders which have the effect of law by virtue of Article 141 and there is mandate to
all authorities to act in aid of the orders of this Court as provided in Article 144
of the Constitution. In a catena of decisions of this Court, this power has been 
recognised and exercised, if need be, by issuing necessary directions to fill the 
vacuum till such time the legislature steps in to cover the gap or the executive
discharges its role. It is in the discharge of this duty that the IRC was constituted
by the Government of India with a view to obtain its recommendations after an 
in-depth study of the problem in order to implement them by suitable executive
directions till proper legislation is enacted. The report of the IRC has been given
to the Government of India but because of certain difficulties in the present 
context, no further action by the executive has been possible. The study having
been made by a Committee considered by the Government of India itself as an 
expert body, it is safe to act on the recommendations of the IRC to formulate the 
directions of this Court, to the extent they are of assistance.”144 
143. See Desai & Muralidhar, supra note 122, at 172; Vineet Narain, (1997) 6 S.C.R. at
598, 640–41. 
144. Vineet Narain, (1997) 6 S.C.R. at 598, 640–41.
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The Court dramatically reorganized and altered the structure of the
CBI and the Enforcement Directorate, ordering them to directly report to 
the Court, in light of evidence of political tampering with the investigation.
In fact, the Court established a new oversight body—the Central Vigilance 
Commission—to monitor the CBI. Finally, the Court, in a bold move, 
invalidated the “single directive” protocol, which required that the CBI
receive prior authorization from a government official before proceeding 
with an investigation against high ranking government officials. Again,
the government acquiesced to the Court in this case. The result of the 
Court’s intervention into the CBI’s investigation was the filing of 34
chargesheets against 54 persons, including leading cabinet ministers and
other government officials.  Ultimately, the Congress government of
Prime Minister Rao suffered defeat in the elections of May 1996, as a
result of the Court’s intervention. 
4. Other Areas: Education, Human Rights, and  
Affirmative Action 
The Court has continued to build on its expansive rights jurisprudence 
to recognize new rights and even legislate on key issues.  In the Mohini 
Jain145 and Unni Krishnan146 cases, the Court recognized that the right to
education flowed out of the right to life by directly reading the directive 
principles of social policy into the fundamental rights provisions.  In the 
Vishaka147 decision, the Court held that sexual harassment violated the
rights of gender equality and the right to life and liberty under Articles 
14, Article 15, and Article 21 of the Constitution, and held that until
Parliament adopted a law implementing the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (to which India was a 
signatory), the Court would adopt the guidelines of the Convention and 
thereby make them enforceable.148  The Court also recognized that the
right to food was part of the right to life in Article 21 and therefore,
justiciable in the P.U.C.L. v. Union of India litigation. The Court further
recognized that the government had a positive duty to help prevent 
145. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 S.C.R. 658, 661, 668–69. 
146. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andra Pradesh, (1993) 1 S.C.R. 594, 603. 
147. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 3 Supp. S.C.R. 404, 407, 410. 
148. See Desai & Muralidhar, supra note 122, at 178. 
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malnutrition and starvation.149  The Court recently ordered that the Indian
government pay 1.4 million rupees to help combat starvation and
malnutrition through implementation of the Integrated Child Development 
Services plan.150 
In the last two decades, the Court has increasingly taken on difficult 
and thorny political and policy issues that the central government is 
either unable or unwilling to resolve. In one of the most controversial
decisions in recent memory, the Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union   
of India151 helped to diffuse and mitigate agitation and strife across
Northern India among upper castes following V.P. Singh’s decision to 
implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission in 1990, 
which called for 27% reservations for the Other Backward Classes
(OBCs) in the civil services. The case was brought as a PIL writ petition 
by Indra Sawhney, a journalist.  The major political parties and the two
succeeding governments refused to take positions on the divisive issue, 
and deferred to the Court to resolve the controversial and complex
issue.152  Ultimately, the Court upheld the validity of the reservations, 
but also held that these reservations could not exceed fifty percent of the
posts available, that there should be no reservations in the area of 
promotions, and that the creamy layers among the OBCs “should be 
gradually made ineligible for reservation.”153  In addition to reservations, 
the Court has also played a greater role in dealing with corruption and 
political disputes within Parliament, often adjudicating thorny “political 
questions.”154  PIL thus provides a way for political elites to avoid resolving 
political “hot potatoes.”155 
One explanation for the dramatic expansion of the Court’s role in
governance through PIL is bureaucratic failure, corruption, and general 
unresponsiveness on the part of the government.156  The Indian judiciary 
has thus assumed a role that is somewhat similar to the phenomenon of
“adversarial legalism” described by Robert Kagan in the United States, 
though unlike the U.S., the initial push for public interest litigation was 
149. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2007) 1 S.C.C. 728, 728
(ordering state governments and union territories to implement the Integrated Child
Development Scheme).
150. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2007) 1 S.C.C. 719. 
151. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 447, 507, 512. 
152. See Sathe, supra note 9, at 273–74. 
153. Id. at 423–33, 570–73, 687–703, 720–56, 766–72. 
154. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3, at 36; Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha, (2007) 1 
S.C.R. 317 (upholding the Court’s expulsion of MPs in cash-for-query scandal and the 
Court’s power to review exercise of parliamentary privileges).
155. See Mark A. Graber, The Non-majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference 
to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
156. See ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 3, at 36. 
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initially triggered by the Supreme Court, and not legal advocacy
organizations.157 Through the PIL regime, the Court asserted itself to 
“push” the government to take action to remedy governance failures, such
as the failure to enforce environmental or corruption laws.  The Court
thus has assumed an “accountability” function that indirectly assists the 
government by attempting to hold the executive branch accountable to 
the command of statutory and constitutional law in governance matters.
IV. COMPARING THE TWO “MOMENTS” AND PATHS
A. Moments and Legitimation Strategies
The basic structure decisions, and the development of PIL, each represent 
two qualitatively different types of moments or paths that have been an
important part of the Court’s empowerment story.  Both represent different
legitimization strategies for consolidating and building power.  The
Golak Nath and Kesavananda decisions represented a response to the 
Gandhi government’s efforts to limit the Court’s ability to review land
reform and nationalization laws related to property rights, while the PIL 
regime was motivated both by key justices’ own social-egalitarian
worldviews and values, and by the justices’ desire to regain legitimacy
lost during the emergency “by widening the scope of judicial power in
quite a socially visible manner.”158 
However, each strategy or approach is fraught with different types of
risk. The risk associated with an aggressive “constitutional entrenchment”
strategy such as the assertion of the power to invalidate constitutional 
amendments in the basic structure decisions is the possibility of non-
compliance or outright retaliation.  The Court triggered direct backlash 
in response to its basic structure decisions, as the Gandhi regime
ultimately attacked the Court through the appointment process, and 
curbed judicial power following the declaration of Emergency rule in
1975.  The PIL-judicialization of governance strategy also carries some 
risk in that it might lead the government to reign in the Court where it 
intervenes in politically sensitive matters.  In fact, in April of 2007, 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was highly critical of the Court in his 
remarks at a conference of Chief Ministers and High Court Chief
157. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
3 (2001).
158. See BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 124. 
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Justices, noting that the Court has been overreaching into the domain of
the other branches.159  And Justice Katju’s critique on the Court’s expanded
role PIL also reflects increasing levels of concern within the Court itself,
and among jurists and lawyers, about the Court’s activism and expanded 
role in governance. 
But the PIL strategy also allows courts to act strategically in expanding 
their roles in governance and policymaking through the gradual and 
incremental process of case-by-case dispute resolution, by occasionally 
accommodating the political interests or agenda of political elites, and 
while simultaneously broadening jurisdiction and its own remedial 
powers. Additionally, the PIL movement has the added advantage of 
broadening the Court’s base of support beyond its earlier base of elite 
claimants, and an “inertial” path-dependency effect whereby the Court
becomes “embedded” in many aspects of governance and problem-
solving, making the Court indispensable to ruling elites and elites 
dependent on the Court.  It thus becomes increasingly difficult to attack
a Court that has become a significant institution of governance, and one 
that secures accountability from the Executive and Administrative branches. 
B. Toward a Typology of Judicial Moments and Functions 
1. The Basic Structure Doctrine and Constitutional    
Entrenchment Moments
The assertion of the basic structure doctrine in India represented an 
exemplar of what I refer to as a “constitutional entrenchment” moment.
The Court’s basic structure decisions in Kesavananada and later cases
illustrate how courts may assert limits on governments to prevent them
from amending the Constitution in a way that violates certain entrenched
constitutional norms or principles.  The Indian Court’s basic structure 
decisions solidified the Court’s “super” anti-majoritarian function in 
imposing limits on the abilities of majorities to do violence to the core 
principles underlying the Indian Constitution.
159. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister, Administration of Justice on Fast Track, 
Speech Delivered at the Conference of Chief Ministers of States and Chief Justices of 
High Courts (April 8, 2007), in (2007) 4 S.C.C. J-9, J-12 (observing that, “At the same
time, the dividing line between judicial activism and judicial overreach is a thin one.  As 
an example, compelling action by authorities of the State through the power of mandamus is
an inherent power vested in the judiciary.  However, substituting mandamus with a takeover 
of the functions of another organ may, at times, become a case of overreach. . . [s]o is the 
case with public interest litigation.  PILs have great utility in initiating corrective action. 
At the same time, PILs cannot become vehicles for settling political or other scores.  We 
need standards and benchmarks for screening PILs so that only genuine PILs with a
justiciable cause of action based on judicially manageable standards are taken up.”). 
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It should be noted that my conceptualization of a constitutional 
entrenchment moment is distinct from Bruce Ackerman’s conception of 
a “constitutional moment”.160  For Ackerman, a constitutional moment
describes a process by which constitutional change is achieved outside 
the formal channels of the amendment process, yet avoids the problem 
of revolutionary legitimacy that taints periods of constitutional revolution 
and change that violate the norm of legality.161  Constitutional moments 
for Ackerman thus consist of exceptional periods in which “higher
lawmaking” is driven by transformative political movements that ultimately
and permanently alter the constitutional framework by pushing for 
constitutional reform that is ratified by subsequent elections, and
ultimately codified in judicial decisions.162 
In contrast to Ackerman’s conception of a constitutional moment,
constitutional entrenchment moments differ in that they involve court-
led processes to either entrench or redefine constitutional frameworks.      
I suggest that there are two types of constitutional entrenchment
moments in the literature on comparative law: “protective entrenchment”          
and “constitutive entrenchment” moments. In protective entrenchment
moments, courts assert themselves by “pressing the brakes” against efforts
by political majorities to make dramatic changes to the core substantive 
commitments and guarantees embodied in a nation’s constitution.  The 
assertion of the basic structure doctrine in India fits this typology. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases is 
another example of a protective entrenchment moment.  In contrast, 
constitutive entrenchment moments describe judicial decisions in which 
high courts entrench ordinary laws or rights provisions into constitutional 
norms or law, effectively creating new constitutional provisions.  The 
160. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3, 8–16, 33–57 (1991). It 
should also be noted here that Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have advanced a model of
constitutional change that is distinct from Ackerman’s model.  Balkin and Levinson have 
argued that constitutional change and transformation is driven by a process of “partisan
entrenchment.”  According to this model, the party regime in control of the Presidency and
executive branch in the United States effectuates constitutional change through the 
appointment of judges to the federal courts who share the partisan or policy values and goals
of the President’s party. These judges then help advance the partisan or policy agenda of the
party through judicial decisions.  See Jack M. Balkin and Sanford, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2001). 
161. See Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative 
Constitutional Context, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 193, 205–07 (2008) (citing ACKERMAN, 
supra note 160, at 16). 
162. ACKERMAN, supra note 160,  at 14. 
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Israeli Supreme Court’s decision in the Bank Hamizrachi 163 case is an 
example of this latter type of entrenchment. 
a. The United States: The Slaughter-House             
Cases—Protective Entrenchment 
The Slaughter-House Cases164 involved a challenge by New
Orleans butchers against a Louisiana state law granting a livestock and
slaughter-house company a monopoly in New Orleans.  The butchers 
argued that the state law interfered with their ability to practice their 
trade and vocation, and thus violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.  The U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the critical task
of interpreting the scope and meaning of the post-Civil War amendments, 
including the Fourteenth Amendment.  In ruling against the petitioners, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Slaughter-House interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment narrowly, and refused to recognize broad privileges and
immunities at the national level (while noting that state privileges and
immunities were more extensive and broad), because doing so would 
entail a radical restructuring of the original design of federalism as set
forth by the framers in the Constitution. 
Given the lack of clear textual support for such a reading, the Court 
narrowly construed national privileges and immunities in light of
original and historical intent. Justice Miller’s opinion, in laying out the 
argument for a narrow reading of the privileges and immunities clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, seems to embody shades of the type of basic 
structure doctrine set forth in Kesavananda: 
But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-
reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our 
institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by
subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore
universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character;
when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State
and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the 
people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of language
which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.165 
The obvious difference between the Slaughter-House Cases and 
Kesavananda, is that while the former dealt with federalism and the 
scope of individual rights, the latter purported to articulate a much broader
conception of a basic structure doctrine with significant implications for 
163. CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal. Agric. Coop. 49(4) PD 221 
[1995] (Isr.). 
164. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 36 (1872). 
165. Id. at 78. 
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the separation of powers.  Additionally, the Slaughter-House court did 
not invalidate the Fourteenth Amendment, though in construing the 
Amendment narrowly, the decision, in the words of Justice Swayne’s
dissent, “turned what was meant for bread into stone.”166  Another key 
difference that illustrates that there is likely broad variation in constitutional
entrenchment moments is that the Slaughter-House Cases were largely 
rights-diminishing decisions, while Kesavananda laid the foundation for 
the protection of the fundamental rights provisions.  Ultimately, Justice 
Chandrachud in the Minerva Mills decision ruled that the fundamental 
rights protections in Article 14, Article 19, and Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution, which dealt with equality, the seven freedoms, due process,
life and liberty, respectively, formed a “golden triangle” that was basic
to the Indian Constitution, along with the Directive Principles of State 
Policy decision in Minerva Mills.
b. Israel: The Bank Hamizrachi Case— 
Constitutive Entrenchment 
Another example of constitutional entrenchment can be found in the 
Israeli Supreme Court’s decision in the Bank Hamizrachi case, in which
an eight judge majority led by Justices Barak and Justice Shamgar (with
one dissenting vote) asserted the power to review ordinary legislation for 
conformity with the new Basic Laws, which effectively entrenched all of
Israel’s Basic Laws, and transformed Israel’s unwritten constitution to a 
written one.167  As Reichmann illustrates, the Israeli Court in Hamizrachi 
adjudicated a challenge to a law enacted to provide relief to the moshavim 
(agricultural settlements with some degree of collective ownership) in 
the settling of claims with creditors.  While Justice Barak and the
majority of the Court ultimately entrenched the Basic Laws to give them 
constitutional status, the Court upheld the moshavim relief law on
procedural grounds, given that the law met the requirements of the 
“limitation clause” of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which
166. Id. at 129.
167. See Amnon Reichman, Jumpstarting a Constitution, Or the Power and Limits 
of Legacy, The Israeli Constitutional Revolution as a Tale of Law and Politics (Nov. 15, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Andrew W. Mellon Sawyer Seminar, 
The Dilemmas of Judicial Power in Comparative Perspective, Center for the Study of
Law and Society) (on file with author).
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allowed for laws limiting the rights therein that were enacted for a 
“proper purpose.”168 
Unlike the decisions in Kesavananda and the Slaughter-House Cases, 
the Hamizrachi decision did not reject efforts by a political regime to
trigger constitutional change. Instead, the Israeli Court entrenched the 
Basic Laws enacted by a prior political regime into a new constitutional 
framework.  Ran Hirschl argues that the 1992 constitutional revolution
in Israel that brought about the enactment of the Basic Laws was driven
by a coalition of secular political, business, and legal elites who sought
to entrench protections for property and individual rights.169  As the  
power of these groups began to diminish, they sought to affect a transfer 
of power to the judiciary through the entrenchment of these rights. 
2. Public Interest Litigation and the Judicialization 
of Governance 
PIL has been aggressively utilized by the Indian Court to reign in 
government agencies or bodies that either tolerate, or even violate
themselves, the violation of constitutional rights provisions, or fail to 
enforce and implement both statutory and constitutionally mandated
policies. The Court has thus gradually gained power as it has become 
increasingly involved in monitoring, overseeing, and even directing
government activity in matters of environmental policy, land planning, 
development, education, affirmative action, health care, and other areas.
The Court’s power and role in governance has dramatically increased
over time through an iterative process in which an increasing number of 
public interest groups, and public-minded individuals and advocates, 
have taken advantage of loosened standing to challenge governance 
failures across a wide range of policy domains.  In this sense, PIL has
enabled the Court to gradually accrete power in a cyclical, path-
dependent “chakra” that is similar to Stone Sweet’s analysis of the
empowerment of the French Constitutional Council from 1974 onward.170 
In fact, as Stone Sweet illustrates, the judicialization of governance in 
France was facilitated by complementary constitutional entrenchment 
and judicialization of governance moments.  In 1971, the Council effectively
entrenched and incorporated a new bill of rights in invalidating, for the 
168. Id. at 12. 
169. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 71, 89–90 (2004). 
170. ALEC STONE SWEET, Constitutional Politics in France and Germany, in  ON 
LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 184–207 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet ed., 
2002). 
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first time, a piece of legislation.171  And in 1974, the Constitution was 
amended to enable any sixty senators or deputies to refer a piece of
proposed legislation to the Council.172 As a result, the Council’s caseload 
dramatically increased and consisted mostly of opposition references 
challenging the majority government.173  Stone Sweet argues that the
entrenchment of rights and expansion of standing created a steady stream of
referrals that “produced a self-sustaining process of judicialization.”174 
These referrals facilitated the construction of a new body of constitutional
law “to justify annulment in terms of an authoritative interpretation of
constitutional rules,” which in turn “provoked more referrals” from 
opposition parties.175 
The expansion of standing helped facilitate a similar process of
judicialization in India, although the Indian Court’s role expansion was 
largely driven by the government’s failures to enforce existing statutory
law, and by governance failures.  By broadening standing doctrine to
invite a broad array of public interest governance claims in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the Indian Court was able to transform itself 
from an institution that adjudicated the claims of landed and upper class 
elites, to dealing with a much broader array of claims from new public 
interest groups and actors challenging the government and private actors 
across a wide array of policy and issue domains.  This phenomenon was 
aided by the lack of responsible government and by corruption and
bureaucratic failures that further increased the demand for judicial
intervention and oversight of administrative bodies.176  Over time, the
Court’s expanded role in adjudicating these claims resulted in the creation 
of a new corpus of constitutional rights and equitable remedies that 
ultimately solidified the Court’s own power, and enabled it to assert 
limits on the government’s power in controversial areas like affirmative 
action.177 
However, as Pratap Bhanu Mehta observed, it is not entirely clear






176. See KAGAN, supra note 157. 
177. See  ALEC STONE SWEET, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 
in ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION, supra note 168, at 69–71, 78–82. 
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generates predictable results in all areas.178  Instead, Mehta suggests that 
the Court’s excessive interventions through PIL have prompted critiques 
that the Court’s decisions are too arbitrary, or too pragmatic, and not 
guided by predictable standards from both outside and even from within 
the Court (as evidenced by the Aravali Golf Club decision.)179  This is 
supported by Cunningham’s analysis of the Court’s practice of creating
ad hoc “remedies without rights” through interim orders.180  The Indian 
Court’s expanded role as an institution of governance suggests an important 
insight—that courts may be less constrained by legal doctrine and
precedent, and more constrained by policy/political factors, in adjudicating 
governance disputes than ordinary claims. 
Still, what is clear is that through PIL, the Court has altered accountability
norms and administrative structures through the creation of investigative 
bodies and oversight commissions that have supplanted the role of 
ministries. As the Court has become more “embedded” as a political
actor through the judicialization of governance, it has become more 
difficult for the government to reign in the Court, though as Justice 
Katju and Mathur’s decision indicates, the judiciary runs the risk of 
political backlash where its decisions start appearing as though they are 
entirely driven by policy or other non-legal considerations.
V. REVISITING MADISON’S DILEMMA: LIMITED GOVERNMENT,
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
In a sense, constitutional entrenchment and the judicialization of
governance represent judicial responses to the twin threats of tyranny
and the total breakdown of governance in a polity.  James Madison
identified these two threats to constitutional democracy in Federalist 51, 
in which he wrote: “In framing a government which is to be administered 
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it
to control itself.”181 
178. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 70, 
72, 80–82 (2007) (observing that: “The second irony is that even as the Supreme Court
has established itself as a forum for resolving public-policy problems, the principles
informing its actions have become less clear. To the extent that the rule of law means making 
available a forum for appeals, one can argue that the Court has done a decent job. To the 
extent that the rule of law means articulating a coherent public philosophy that produces
predictable results, the Court’s interventions look less impressive.”).
179. See id.
180. See Cunningham, supra note 94. 
181. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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A. The Credible Commitments Problem 
Constitutional entrenchment moments reflect efforts by courts to force 
political regimes to honor the original “credible commitments”182 made 
in the original constitutional framework.  As North and Weingast argue, 
it is in the interest of sovereign political regimes to limit their own power
through the entrenchment of rights in order to make credible their 
commitment to lenders, investors, and citizens.183  In enacting constitutions 
that establish independent judiciaries with judicial review, Daniel Farber 
observed that political regimes send a “signal” to private capital, as well 
as to the citizenry, of their commitment to protecting basic economic 
rights and individual freedoms.184  By imposing limits on its own powers, 
political regimes secure increased levels of capital investment and 
greater levels of participation and compliance from citizens.185  In contrast, 
regimes that fail to impose limits on their own power can face financial
ruin and even revolution.186 
Although it may be in their interest to honor those original credible 
commitments laid out in written constitutions, political regimes in
different polities have often failed at honoring many of these commitments, 
often as a result of immediate fiscal pressures or shortfalls.187 In other
instances, political regimes have turned away from commitments that
were deemed to be flawed or inherently undemocratic or unjust.  In the 
context of constitutional entrenchment moments, then, I suggest that 
there are two critical dynamics that have often led to credible commitment 
failures or movements to turn away from original commitments in
constitutional democracies: (1) the existence of competing commitments,
often expressed in conflicting provisions of a constitution; and (2) the 
emergence of transformative social or political movements that seek to 
182. See Douglas C. North & Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitments: The
Evolution of Public Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 803 (1989), reprinted in  THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
LIBERALIZATION IN THE MODERN WORLD 16, 17, 43–47 (Paul W. Drake & Mathew D. 
McCubbins eds., 1998).
183. See David S. Law, The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and
Commitments, 40 GA. L. REV. 407, 411 (2006) (citing ORIGINS OF LIBERTY, supra note 
178, at 20–21). 
184. See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 103–16 (2002). 
185. Id.
 186. ORIGINS OF LIBERTY, supra note 182, at 20–21. 
187. Law, supra note 193, at 415 n.6 (citing ORIGINS OF LIBERTY, supra note 182, at 
16, 20–21). 
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ameliorate core failings in the original commitments enshrined in
constitutions, such as a state of political or social inequality.
1. Competing Commitments
Like many world constitutions, the Indian Constitution embodies 
competing commitments to different goals and values. The Constituent 
Assembly, in framing the Indian Constitution, was thus faced with the
daunting task of constructing a constitution that could lay a foundation 
for ameliorating systemic caste-based and economic inequality, while 
providing basic protections for economic rights and civil liberties and 
freedoms.  The Indian Constitution sought to balance the Nehruvian 
aspirational vision of an egalitarian society contained in the Directive 
Principles of Social Policy, against the Fundamental Rights, a set of 
negative rights or limits on government power.188  The former articulated
the “humanitarian socialist precepts” at the heart of “the Indian social
revolution,” though these principles were originally designated as non-
justiciable.189  The Fundamental Rights, in contrast, set forth explicit,
justiciable negative rights, and was modeled in great part on the American
Bill of Rights.190 
Gary Jacobsohn highlighted the transformative, yet conflicted nature 
of the Indian Constitution, when he wrote that “the Indian Constitution,
while by no means free of internal tension, is committed to a specific 
sociopolitical agenda involving major reform of an essentially feudal 
society.”191  In analyzing this unique “disharmonic political” context in
India, Jacobsohn alludes to the potential for crisis embedded within this 
constitutional framework—that political regimes may inevitably elevate 
one group of competing commitments over the other, even at the risk of 
undermining the original framework. And this potential was realized
during Gandhi’s attempts to curb judicial review in her attempts to enact
and fully implement her government’s agenda of land reform.  Thus, the 
Gandhi regime ultimately justified subordinating the fundamental rights, 
and ultimately the Constitution’s provision for judicial review in order to
enact policies that it deemed essential to fulfilling the promise of the 
social-egalitarian aspirations of the directive principles.  The Indian 
Court in Kesavananda, and later Minerva Mills and Waman Rao, asserted 
the basic structure doctrine in order to re-establish some type of equilibrium
188. See  GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A
NATION 50–83 (1966).
189. Id. at 75. 
190. Id. at 55.
 191. Gary Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1763, 1768 (2004). 
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and balance between the directive principles and fundamental rights that
had been endangered by the Gandhi regime. 
Two additional examples of the problem of competing commitments 
involve federalism in India and the United States. In India, the rise of the 
Hindu right forced the Indian Court to adjudicate a federalism dispute in 
the Bommai case. But in Bommai, the Indian Court invoked the basic 
structure doctrine in holding that the central government could invoke 
its emergency powers to suspend state governments that had failed to
safeguard and protect secularism.  In essence, the Court held that federalism
could be subordinated to another competing commitment—secularism.
In adjudicating the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, and the 
Privileges of Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, the 
United States Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases was forced
to reconcile another set of competing commitments—strong federal 
protection of equality and citizenship-based substantive rights, and a 
core structural commitment to a federal system of government. 
2. Transformative Political and Social Movements 
A second threat to credible commitments in the original constitutional
framework of polity can come from transformative social or political
movements that seek to ameliorate core defects in the framework, such 
as social or political inequality. The enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States marked the culmination 
of one phase of an ongoing struggle to confront slavery and the foundational 
problem of social and political inequality in American society.  This is
consistent with Ackerman’s conception of a “constitutional moment,” in
which social or political movements lead to changes in the core
commitments enshrined in constitutions.  
B. The Judicialization of Governance and      
the Legitimacy of Courts 
Although policing the limits of government power is a vital function
of courts, as Madison observed, the primary concern of a government
must be to ensure that it can control the governed, or put another way, to
ensure that it can govern effectively. As demonstrated in this article, and 
in previous scholarship, courts can play a valuable role in the monitoring 
and oversight of the implementation of enacted statutes and policies.  As 
David Law observes, courts can also play a vital function in coordinating 
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public behavior in the policing of government behavior.192  This expanded 
role in governance has significant implications for the legitimacy of
courts as institutions. 
In enhancing accountability and expanded opportunities for participation 
in governance, I suggest here that judicialization of governance moments, 
on balance, provides a superior vehicle for bolstering the legitimacy of 
courts than constitutional entrenchment moments.  Judicialization allows 
courts to act strategically in expanding their role in governance and 
policymaking through the gradual and incremental process of case-by-
case dispute resolution, by occasionally accommodating the political 
interests or agenda of political elites, while simultaneously broadening 
jurisdiction and its own remedial powers.  Additionally, as the Indian
case demonstrates, judicialization of governance can broaden a court’s
base of support beyond its earlier base of elite claimants.  Through an 
iterative process, judicialization produces an “inertial” path-dependency 
effect whereby the Court becomes “embedded” in many aspects of 
governance and problem-solving, making the Court indispensable to
ruling elites, and elites dependent on the Court.  As a result, the Court 
also builds popular support nationally as it enhances its credibility as an
institution. It thus becomes increasingly difficult to attack a Court that 
has become a significant institution of governance, and one that secures 
accountability from the Executive and Administrative branches. 
This article illustrates that it is in the realm of governance that courts 
can play their most significant role.  In India, France, and the United 
States, courts have helped bolster the legitimacy and stability of political
regimes by providing an alternative forum and mechanism through
which individuals, civil society and public interest groups, and others 
can seek to ameliorate government illegality and governance failures.  In 
a sense, by enhancing governance, courts also force regimes to keep
their credible commitments to basic fundamental rights, and can, in the 
long run, aid regimes in securing investment, citizen participation, and
overall compliance.  By playing a critical role in promoting accountability
and effectiveness in governance, courts can play an indispensable role in 
maintaining political and social stability, and protecting democracy. 
Where political or structural fragmentation, or corruption and graft,
undermine the ability of governments to perform even the most basic of
functions, this paper suggests that governance concerns must necessarily
trump concerns about constitutional change, though systemic governance 
failures may eventually trigger constitutional transformation. 
192. See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO.
L. REV. 723 (2009). 
220
MATE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2010 11:32 AM     
  

























[VOL. 12:  175, 2010] Two Paths to Judicial Power
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
VI. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON JUDICIAL POWER IN INDIA
The history of the empowerment of the Indian Supreme Court offers 
important insights about the relative importance of constitutional
entrenchment and the judicialization of governance, especially in light of 
the ubiquitous nature of these moments.  While the basic structure
doctrine is critical in that it allowed the Indian Court to set limits on the 
power of the Indian government to recast the Constitution to circumvent 
judicial decisions, this paper suggests that the Court’s decision in The 
First Judges’ Case and other early PIL decisions, represented the “moment
that mattered” when examining the enormous expansion of the Court’s
role in governance today.  Justice Katju and  Justice Mathur’s critique of 
PIL in the Aravali Golf Club Case of December 2007, highlights the 
expansion of the Court’s role and the judicialization of governance that 
was triggered by the PIL revolution, as well as the existence of conflicting 
role conceptions among justices of the Court today about the Court’s 
present role and status as an institution of governance. 
While the Aravali Golf Club case has no doubt ignited a renewed
debate about the expansion of the Court’s governance role, it seems 
unlikely that the frustrations of two justices on a smaller panel will be
able to wholly reverse or undo the development of PIL.  In a recent and 
appropriately entitled article, It is Too Late to Put a Lid on PILs, leading
scholar and Senior Advocate, Rajeev Dhavan, issued a compelling 
rejoinder to the critique of PIL in the decision: 
Justice Katju’s broadside attack is on PIL cases of schooling, drinking water, 
beds in hospitals on public land, misuses of ambulances, creating a world class
burns board, Delhi air pollution, begging in subways, CNG buses, legality of 
constructions in Delhi, size of speed breakers, overcharging by autorickshaws
and so on.  He feels these trespass into executive policy . . . . What is a matter of
worry is that Justice Katju has called into question the entire human rights and
social justice jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court over the last 30
years . . . . Justice Katju fails to distinguish between “judicial activism” (which 
is permissible) and “judicial excessivism” (which is not). Judicial activism is
inevitable. India has a forward- looking activist Constitution to impart human
rights and social justice for all. Judges cannot shy away from fulfilling this dream for
all people by inventing new legal techniques to ensure it. Without these techniques, 
the Constitution would become supine.193 
193. Rajeev Dhavan, It is Too Late in the Day to Put a Lid on PIL, MAIL TODAY 
(India), Dec. 17, 2007, at 10. 
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Dhavan here captures the true importance of the PIL revolution in the
development of the Indian Supreme Court since the post-Emergency era, 
and indeed offers guidance in adjudicating between the relative importance
of the two transformative “moments” explored in this paper. 
Judicialization of governance worldwide highlight a dynamic source 
of judicial power in a polity such as India—a broadened constituency of 
public interest litigant groups that have helped to make the Indian Court
a relevant institution in the center of the governance “chakra.” More 
than thirty years after the end of Emergency rule, the Indian Court has 
resurrected and reinvented itself as an independent and active judiciary,
one that has now embedded itself in almost every facet of governance 
imaginable.  Building on its first major governance decision in the
Judges’ Case, the Court through PIL recast itself as a champion of the 
rule of law, and in the process, emerged as a powerful institution of 
governance. 
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